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DuringtheSecondWorldWar,itisargued,‘‘theneurosesofbattle’’notonlydeepenedan
understandingof‘‘psychopathologicalmechanisms’’,
1butalsocreatedopportunitiesforthe
practice of psychotherapy, while its perceived efficacy led to a broader acceptance within
medicine and society once peace had returned.
2 This recognition is contrasted with the
aftermath of the First World War when a network of outpatient clinics, set up by the
Ministry of Pensions to treat veterans with shell shock, were closed within a few years
in response to financial pressures and doubts about their therapeutic value. In the private
sector, psychoanalysis under the leadership of Ernest Jones remained an idiosyncratic
activity confined largely to the affluent middle classes of London.
3 According to Gregorio
Kohon, ‘‘it was strongly opposed by the general public, the Church, the medical and
psychiatric establishment, and the press’’.
4 The Medico-Psychological Clinic of London,
originallysetupin1913,offeredpsychotherapyonthreeafternoonsaweekinpremisesat30
BrunswickSquare underthe direction ofDrJames Glover.However,itclosedin1923after
Glover and his brother Edward had both become psychoanalysts.
5 As the First World War
drew to a close, Maurice Craig helped to persuade Sir Ernest Cassel to fund a hospital for
‘Functional and Nervous Disorders’ at Penshurst, Kent, to treat neuroses in the civilian
population.
6 Although moved to permanent premises near Richmond, it remained small-
scale and at the time no attempt was made to establish a network of similar institutions
throughout the UK. The Tavistock Clinic, opened in Bloomsbury in 1920, struggled to
securefundingthroughouttheinterwarperiodanditseffortstowinofficialrecognitionfrom
the University of London were consistently rebutted.
7 Thus, despite the epidemic of shell
shockandotherso-calledwarneuroses,psychotherapyremainedamarginalactivityduring
the 1920s and 1930s.
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493During the Second World War, or so the argument goes, the need to return every
psychiatric battle casualty to active duty, or at the very least to productive employment
in civilian life, created important opportunities for therapists.
8 Both psychiatrists and
psychologists were recruited into the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) where they
experimented with novel treatments,
9 drawing on ideas from psychoanalysis and social
psychology. The work of Wilfrid Bion, John Rickman and Michael Foulkes at Northfield
and Maxwell Jones at Mill Hill is said to have transformed the role of groups, while
occupational, art and individual therapies advanced in psychiatric hospitals run by or
for the military.
10 Having proved their worth in wartime, these clinical services were
adopted within the National Health Service and in the private sector.
11 The war, it is
suggested, had served as a significant catalyst for change and innovation.
By way of re-interpretation, it is proposed here that wartime psychotherapy was not as
efficaciousasclaimed.Servicemenwerenotbyandlargereturnedtoactiveduty,andmany
were downgraded or discharged after treatment. Published accounts may have been biased
by questions of morale to exaggerate clinical effectiveness. Hence, when these techniques
were introduced in the post-war health service they were accompanied by expectations
raised beyond what might be reasonably achieved. This occurred at a time when attitudes
towardsthenatureofmentalillnessandroleofpsychotherapy,atleastwithinpsychiatryand
psychology, were in a state of flux. In an economy characterized by rationing, finite
resources placed severe constraints on what could be provided in the public sector and
these inflated results plausibly did no service to the long-term development of psycho-
dynamic treatments.
Definitions
No satisfactory definition of psychotherapy exists, largely because of its broad clinical
applicationanddissensionwithintrainingorganizationsastoitstheoreticalbasis.However,
David Malan summarized the basic principles of dynamic psychotherapy as a relationship
betweenpatientandtherapistdesignedtoenabletheformer‘‘tounderstandhistruefeelings
and to bring them to the surface and experience them’’.
12 As a treatment directed towards
psychological self-awareness, it embraced both short focused interventions and long-term,
five times a week therapies, together with individual or group approaches. Although
psychoanalysiswasthedominantmodelduringtheSecondWorldWar,itwascharacterized
by theoretical disagreement and fissure.
13 Furthermore, most doctors who practised
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Edgar Jonespsychotherapy inamilitary settingwerenotpsychoanalystsbutpsychiatricspecialistswith
an interest in unconscious processes. It would be wrong to attribute the spread of psycho-
dynamicideasandtreatmentsmerelytotheworkofFreudiantherapists.
14Underpressureto
justify their existence and to restore soldiers to active duty, a small number of military
psychiatristsoccasionallypushedthehierarchicalsystemtoitslimitsbyexperimentingwith
such unconventional clinical techniques.
Recruitment of Therapists
In the belief that shell shock could be prevented by selection and training, the armed
forces had let military psychiatry slip into decline during the interwar period and by 1939
therewereonlyhalfadozenregularofficerswithvaryingdegreesofpsychiatricexperience,
someinadministrativeroles.Thisneglectledtoakeyappointment.Ontheoutbreakofwar,
J R Rees, director of the Tavistock Clinic, became consultant psychiatrist to the army at
homeandresponsiblefortheexpansionoftheservice.Awareoftheshortageofpsychiatrists
in the armed forces, Rees had begun to build up a list of potential recruits before war had
been declared.
15 These included Emanuel Miller (a Tavistock-trained child psychiatrist),
Eddie Bennet, a decorated veteran of the First World War, and Wilfrid Bion, who had
recently begun an analysis with John Rickman. Bennet, an analytical psychologist and
friend of Jung, was ultimately sent to India where he organized psychiatric services for the
army in South East Asia.
16
The return of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk in June 1940 brought with it
largenumbersoftroopssufferingfrompsychologicalandfunctionalsomaticdisorders.The
spectre of shell shock loomed.
17 Wouldthe Britisharmy again have to combat an epidemic
ofservicemensufferingfromso-calledwarneuroses?Toforestallthispotentiallydamaging
development, No. 41 General (‘Neuropathic’) Hospital moved to the Sandhill Park Mental
Defective Colony at Bishop’s Lydeard, near Taunton, in August 1940.
18 Under the com-
mand of a regular RAMC psychiatrist, Colonel G W Will,
19 it was designed to treat
psychological disorders in an attempt to return soldiers to active duty or to employment
incivilianlife.TheinfluenceofReescanbeseeninmanyofthepsychiatristssenttoworkat
Bishop’s Lydeard. Responsible for research and teaching at the Tavistock from 1934,
J A Hadfield became clinical director of the neurosis division with the rank of Lt Colonel,
while other appointments included Miller, Alan Maberly and Geoffrey Thompson. Major
Adrian Stephen, the psychoanalyst and brother of Virginia Woolf, was posted there and
taught on the military psychiatry course for medical officers.
14SonuShamdasani, ‘Thepsychoanalyticbody’,in
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War and the Practice of PsychotherapyWithout any particular therapeutic protocol, No. 41 General and its successor, the
Military Psychiatric Hospital, drew on methods practised during the First World War.
Conventional wisdom suggested that after a short period of rest, servicemen should be
rapidly re-introduced to military life by graded physical exercise and occupational therapy
to prevent the development of functional symptoms. In addition, ‘‘some of the more
intelligent patients’’ were offered sessions of persuasion and re-education ‘‘to help them
understand the nature of their neurosis’’. A limited amount of ‘‘superficial analysis ...to
discover the underlying causes of neuroses’’ was practised, though ‘‘deep analysis into
predisposingcausesofneuroses[was]notattemptedinthetimeavailable’’.
20Yetoutcomes
were not impressive. In the quarter to June 1941, for example, only 39 (16 per cent) of 242
discharged patients were returned to duty in the same medical category, and 171
(71 per cent) were invalided from the forces. The introduction of group and occupational
therapy (woodwork, sign writing and other handicrafts) saw improved results, though this
may have been simply the effect of screening before referral to Bishop’s Lydeard and the
introduction of stricter discharge criteria designed to keep men in the armed forces so that
theydidnotbecomeaburdenonthepensionsystem.Asaresult,inthequartertoSeptember
1943,526patients(50.2percent)wereretainedinthearmy,thoughofteninalowermedical
category thereby limiting the roles that they could undertake. However, the introduction of
psychiatric units overseas to treat those with a good prognosis saw the return-to-duty rate
fallto35.9percentbyMarch1944becauseofthe increasing tendencytosendonlychronic
or severe cases to the hospital.
21
Hollymoor Military Hospital, Northfield
Because Bishop’s Lydeard could not cope with the growing number of servicemen
suffering from war neuroses, Hollymoor Hospital at Northfield in Birmingham was trans-
ferredtothemilitaryinApril1942.UnderitsfirstsuperintendentLtColonelJDWPearce,a
Tavistock-trained psychiatrist,
22 it was divided into hospital (200 beds) and training wings
(600beds):thefirstforphysicaltreatmentsoftheacutephaseandthesecondtorehabilitate
servicemen who had partially recovered.
At the end of 1942, it became the subject of a controversial and radical experiment
designed by Majors Bion and Rickman to ‘‘tackle neurotic disability as a communal
problem’’ and thereby instill self-respect and personal responsibility in soldiers who
had already experienced ‘‘such therapeutic value as lies in military discipline, good
food and regular care’’.
23 Rickman, who had been in analysis with both Freud and
Klein, joined the army in April 1942 and spent a few months at Bishop’s Lydeard acclim-
atizing himself to military psychiatry. Based at the Tavistock before the outbreak of war,
Bion had begun a training analysis with Rickman but not yet qualified.
24 As a decorated
20TNA,WO222/759,MedicalQuarterlyReportsof
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21Ibid., Quarterly Report to 30 September 1943;
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Northfield experiments: advancing on a different
front, London, Jessica Kingsley, 2000, p. 155.
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Edgar Jonesveteran of the First World War, he possessed the military credibility that Rickman lacked.
Faced with a regulated, hierarchical institution and patients who might be sent back to
combat if they recovered, they decided to run the training wing of the hospital through a
seriesoflargeleaderlessgroups,sometimescontainingbetween100and200patients.This,
they believed, would devolve a measure of autonomy and make patients aware of their
responsibility for intra-meeting conflicts and by inference for their well-being.
BionandRickmanwerenotthefoundersofgrouptherapy,whichhadbeenpractisedona
limitedscaleintheUKandUnitedStates.In1935,BasilBeaumont,presidentoftheSociety
for Creative Psychology, argued that group psychotherapy constituted ‘‘a serious human
method of bringing psychological freedom and adjustment to people who are not able to
afford an analyst, or for people who have had analytical treatment and now want to put into
practice some of the help received’’.
25 From 1938 Joshua Bierer had run groups at the
newly-constructedRunwellmentalhospitalinWickford,Essex.Althoughlarge,itwasbuilt
on the villa system, which enabled Bierer to organize groups of fifty, which he called
‘‘communities’’, and smaller ones of ten, called ‘‘circles’’. He claimed a success rate of
87 per cent (either discharged cured or improved),
26 and later set up outpatient groups.
AlthoughtheseresultswerepublishedintheBritishMedicalJournalfor14February1942,
Bion and Rickman did not refer to them. In an attempt to loosen institutional ties during
the pre-war period, T P Rees, medical superintendent at Warlingham Park, a large asylum,
had introduced the concept of a hospital club whereby responsibility for its management
was devolved to patients.
The so-called ‘‘first Northfield experiment’’ proved short-lived.
27 After six weeks, con-
cernedby an apparent breakdownindiscipline, the authorities posted Bion and Rickman to
other units.
28 No attempt had been made to evaluate the effectiveness of these groups and
their abbreviated nature made retrospective analysis impossible.
Major Michael Foulkes, a Frankfurt-trained psychoanalyst, was the prime mover in the
second Northfield experiment. Posted to Hollymoor in April 1943 to run a ward in the
training wing, he obtained permission from the new commanding officer, Lt Colonel R J
Rosie, to run small groups on his free afternoons.
29 They had as Rickman observed a
different theoretical basis,
30 being based on Foulkes’ understanding of war neurosis as
a function of failed unit cohesion. Breakdown in combat, Foulkes argued, followed the
fracture of links with peers so that these relationships became a source of strain rather than
mutual support.
31 The group itself was designed to restore a soldier’s self-confidence and
social tolerance of army life by re-introducing him to positive communal functioning.
32
25Basil Beaumont, The technique of group work,
London, Favil Press, 1935, p. 5.
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War and the Practice of PsychotherapyMuchhasrightlybeenmadeoftheroleofmilitarymedicineinservingWeberiannotions
of modernity, the tendency for social institutions to be brought under unified and routine
systems of administration.
33 Historians have suggested that psychiatry in particular ‘‘con-
formed effortlessly to the military demands of rationalization, standardization and hier-
archical discipline’’.
34 While this may have been true of busy medical units treating battle
casualties,itdidnotalwaysapplytospecialistbasehospitalsintheUKwherepsychiatrists,
seeking to rehabilitate soldiers, challenged the military hierarchy in terms of ideas and
procedures. Often they were forced to act covertly or to find sympathetic commanding
officers who would turn a blind eye to what some regarded as interventions likely to
undermine morale or discipline. At other times, by contrast, the military authorities
tookadvantage oftheir ambiguous position (inthe sense that they could serve asapatient’s
advocate in the absence of organic symptoms and objective signs) to circumvent regula-
tions. A ‘‘trick-cyclist’’, for example, might be asked to provide a spurious medical dis-
charge for a brave but ill-disciplined soldier or to justify a transfer to a less dangerous role.
With eight to ten members, the groups run by Foulkes were more manageable than those
of the first Northfield experiment. They met once a week for ninety minutes, though some
patientswerealsoseenindividually.Confidentofthetherapeuticeffects,Foulkesdescribed
outcomes as ‘‘very good. There was scarcely a case which did not benefit, whilst in a large
proportionofthepatientstheimprovementwasconsiderableandsometimesastonishing...
the improvement was genuine and sustained.’’
35
Yet no objective measures were recorded, no controls tested and no follow-ups under-
taken to establish how permanent were the changes identified. In a further paper, Foulkes
adoptedamoremodestline,observingthatinthesixtoeightweeksoftreatment‘‘wecannot
reasonably expect to alter the basic pattern, nor can we undo completely the effects of the
patient’sexperiences’’.
36Healsoconcededthat‘‘itisverydifficulttoassessthetherapeutic
effects exactly at this stage on an ‘objective’—e.g. statistical—basis, because there are so
many variables, and in our own field of observation these variables change so rapidly’’.
37
Thepositivenotestruckinthisandotherpublishedinvestigationsmayhavebeeninfluenced
byaneedtomaintainmorale.Itwouldnothavegonedownwellwiththemilitaryauthorities
had clinicians admitted that soldiers mentally scarred by combat were unlikely to return
rapidly to their pre-service level of functioning.
Internal reports compiled by military psychiatrists and therapists working at Northfield
were less optimistic about outcomes than published accounts. In December 1944, for
example, Lt Colonel Denis Carroll, who had succeeded Rosie as the commanding officer,
wrote ‘‘while some 85% [of admissions] still return to duty, some 80% are in category C2
[those whose physical or psychiatric disabilities made them fit only for home service]
and this figure will increase’’.
38 A psychoanalyst and co-director of the Institute for the
33Roger Cooter and Steve Sturdy, ‘Of war,
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Cooter, Mark Harrison and Steve Sturdy (eds), War,
medicine and modernity, Thrupp, Sutton Publishing,
1998, pp. 1–21.
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Harrison and Sturdy (eds), op. cit., note 33 above,
pp. 225–38, p. 232.
35S H Foulkes and Eve Lewis, ‘Group
analysis: a study in the treatment of groups on
psycho-analytic lines’, Br. J. Med. Psychol.,
1944–46, 20: 179–80.
36Foulkes, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 303.
37Ibid., p. 305.
38TNA, WO222/846, Report on the Work of the
Medical Division, Military (P) Hospital, Northfield,
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Edgar JonesScientific Treatment of Delinquency before enlistment, Carroll kept an open mind about
new treatments. Although he observed that ‘‘group psychotherapy has increased in popu-
larity’’, Carroll concluded that ‘‘it does not appear to have been as helpful as anticipated in
increasing the practicable caseload’’.
39
The Therapeutic Community
Whilst the First World War had demonstrated that the nation’s fittest and bravest could
succumb to mental breakdown,
40 this lesson had largely been forgotten by 1939. The
principle was re-established during the Second World War that everyone, if subjected to
intensestressofcombat,wouldultimatelyceasetofunction.Nolongercouldalinebedrawn
betweenthosewhowereregardedasconstitutionallyinferiorandthoseconsideredinnately
healthy. Furthermore, it was recognized that traditional hospital regimes, when applied to
psychologicaldisorders,robbedpatientsoftheirautonomyandcouldimpederecovery.The
more, it was argued, that could be done to restore self-confidence and a sense of personal
responsibility the better. Posted to command Northfield’s training wing at the end of 1944,
Major Harold Bridger, who had no formal training in psychiatry or psychology, set about
introducing these ideas. By creating a ‘‘hospital club’’ (in effect an empty ward without a
defined purpose), he sought to encourage patients to create their own social organization,
which in turn would give them a sense of purpose and identity.
41 Lt Colonel Tom Main, a
psychiatrist,transferredtoNorthfieldinspring1945,widenedthescopeoftheexperimentto
include everyone in the hospital, coining the term ‘‘therapeutic community’’.
42 He later
wrote that:
The treatment of the neurotic patient, who suffers from a disturbance of social relationships, cannot
therefore be regarded as satisfactory unless it is undertaken within a framework of social reality
which can provide him with opportunities for attaining fuller social insight and for expressing and
modifying his emotional drives according to the demands of real life.
43
As a result, wards were structured ‘‘not as an organization run by doctors in the interests
of their own technical efficiency’’ but as a community ‘‘related to real tasks’’ to provide
opportunities to identify and analyse ‘‘the inter-personal barriers which stand in the way of
participationinafullcommunitylife’’.
44AtNorthfield,thedynamicprocessunderlyingthe
socialinteractionofthewardwastermed‘‘Lewinfiltration’’,areferencetotheexperiments
in the social psychology of groups by Dr Kurt Lewin.
45 In a therapeutic community the
psychiatristwas required to renounce histraditional paternalistic role as doctor andassume
that of reflective commentator and participant in daily activities. Speaking specifically of
grouptherapy,Foulkesarguedthatifthe‘‘psychotherapistresiststhetemptationtobemade
a leader, he will be rewarded by [his patients] growing independence, spontaneity and
39Ibid.
40Mathew Thomson, ‘Constituting citizenship:
mental deficiency, mental health and human rights in
inter-war Britain’, in Christopher Lawrence and
Anna-K Mayer (eds), Regenerating England: science,
medicine and culture in inter-war Britain, Amsterdam,
Rodopi, 2000, pp. 231–50, p. 241.
41Shephard, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 265–7;
Harrison, op. cit., note 22 above, , pp. 205–13.
42‘Obituary Thomas Forrest Main’, Int. J.
Psycho-Anal., 1991, 72: 719–22.
43Main, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 66.
44Ibid., p. 67.
45Bridger, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 75.
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War and the Practice of Psychotherapyresponsibility and personal insight into their social attitudes’’.
46 This radical change in
attitude towards mental illness and the status of patients was perhaps the most significant
psychiatric effect of the war.
Mill Hill EMS Hospital
To provide support for specialist military hospitals, the government took over civilian
establishments under the ‘‘Emergency Medical Services’’ (EMS) scheme. Psychiatrists
from the Maudsley Hospital were recruited to the war effort, being divided between
two suburban units in London. One group, led by W S Maclay as medical superintendent
and including Aubrey Lewis, Eric Guttman and Maxwell Jones, was sent to a converted
public school at Mill Hill. Occupational and social psychiatry was their goal. An ‘‘Effort
Syndrome Unit’’ of 150 beds was set up under the joint directorship of Paul Wood, a
cardiologist, and Jones.
47 Having identified the physiological basis for his patients’ symp-
toms, Jones believed that disorders such as effort syndrome were maladaptive learned
responses.
48 To provide corrective education, lectures involving groups of fifty patients
were provided. However, he soon recognized that their value was limited given the general
level of mistrust felt by patients towards doctors and well-established nature of symptoms.
Formal instruction was abandoned in favour of discussion and the traditional barriers
between doctors, nursing staff and patients were lowered, though not eliminated.
49 Groups
ofninety,stillofaneducationalcharacter,wereheldthreetimesaweekfortwohours,while
programmes of physical exercise and occupational therapy were also provided. A form of
therapeutic community evolved from clinical practice, rather than being theoretically-
driven as in the first Northfield experiment. ‘‘Soldiers in general’’, observed Jones,
‘‘and neurotic soldiers in particular, were always on their guard against being ‘got at’
by those in authority’’ and the group discussion was a way of engaging their active parti-
cipation.
50 Like Hans Eysenck (see below), Jones regarded the symptoms as an essential
feature of the disorder and therapy was tailored to alter the patient’s attitude towards them.
Having discovered the therapeutic effects of groups, Maxwell Jones extended the prin-
ciple to the Effort Syndrome Unit as a whole. By undermining the hierarchical distinctions
between doctors, nurses and patients, he encouraged ‘‘a greater degree of social penetra-
tion’’,aidedby‘‘thetemporarynatureofthehospitalandofthenurseswhoweredrawnfrom
otherprofessions’’.
51However,Bridger,whovisitedMillHillbeforetakinguphisappoint-
ment at Northfield, observed that the closed system focused on the charismatic figure of
Jones himself.
52 This therapeutic community owed as much to social psychiatry (which
assessed the patient’s functioning and interactions within the context of their family,
upbringing and occupation) as to any theory of psychodynamics and demonstrated that
46S H Foulkes, ‘Principles and practice of group
therapy’,Bull.MenningerClinic,1946,10:85–9,p.86.
47Bethlem Royal Hospital Archives, The Medical
Superintendent’s Report on the Organization and
WorkofMillHillEmergencyHospitaltoDecember31
1940, p. 2.
48D W Millard, ‘Maxwell Jones and the
therapeutic community’, Freeman and Berrios
(eds), op. cit., note 11 above, pp. 581–604, on
pp. 583–5.
49Maxwell Jones, A Baker, Thomas Freeman,
Social psychiatry: a study of therapeutic communities,
London, Tavistock Publications, 1952, pp. 2–3.
50Ibid., p. 4.
51Ibid., p. 14.
52Millard, op. cit., note 48 above, p. 589.
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Edgar Jonesprogress in the wider field of psychotherapy was not tied to any particular institution or
discipline. However, despite the urgings of Aubrey Lewis, Jones made little attempt to
evaluate outcomes using statistical techniques.
53
Brief Therapy in the Field (PIE)
The one area where psychotherapy was considered valuable even by military authorities
was on the battlefield. ‘‘Forward psychiatry’’ was considered an effective treatment for
‘‘battleexhaustion’’orwhatwouldnowbetermedcombatstressreaction.Abreaction,orthe
discharge of emotion attached to a repressed experience, had been practised at special
treatment centres close to the front line during the First World War by William Brown and
Frederick Dillon.
54 In the early days of psychoanalysis, the process of re-experiencing was
in itself considered cathartic, regardless of whether the patient understood the underlying
significance of the repressed memory. To encourage recall Brown used light hypnosis and
claimed to have returned 91 per cent of admissions to full duty.
55 Given the large numbers
admittedtotheseunitsandthelimitedtimeavailabletoeachpatient,theseresultsarehardto
substantiate. Other more sceptical doctors, such as William Johnson and Dudley Carmalt
Jones,believedthatabreaction,byre-traumatizing soldiers,interruptedaprocessofnatural
recovery. Nevertheless, this story of therapeutic success found its way into the official
histories and it was widely proclaimed that 80 per cent of shell-shocked patients treated by
forward psychiatry returned to operational duties with combat units.
56
The system was publicized by Thomas Salmon, who introduced these methods to the
American army in 1917.
57 Much later the intervention was described by the acronym,
PIE, to refer to the treatment’s essential qualities: proximity (close to the battle) imme-
diacy (as soon as possible after the breakdown to prevent the accretion and hardening of
symptoms) and expectancy (the conviction that recovery was a natural outcome of
therapy).
58
During the Second WorldWar, PIE methods were rediscovered by the British during the
Western Desert campaign, and subsequently employed in Italy and northwest Europe once
the Normandy beachhead had been established. Treatment in ‘‘Exhaustion Centres’’
(so-named to avoid medical terminology and to encourage notions of natural recovery)
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on pp. 30–1.
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1918, ii: 197–200.
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War and the Practice of Psychotherapywas not uniform, depending in part on the preferences of individual medical officers.
Becauseofthelargenumbersadmittedtothesecentresduringbattle,sedationandgraduated
exercise were the most common interventions. Re-education and brief focused therapy
sometimesassistedby hypnosiswerealso practised. AsMajorJEBurch ofNo.1Canadian
Exhaustion Unit, which operated in Normandy, observed in September 1944, ‘‘deeper
analysis is required but seldom. Abreaction has been attempted using intravenous barbi-
turates but this has not been found to be of value therapeutically and has been given up’’.
59
By contrast, Captain Patrick de Mare ´, who ran a 100-bed Exhaustion Centre at 31 Field
Dressing Station in France and Holland during 1944, favoured abreaction sometimes
assisted by light hypnosis. This reflected his own interests in psychotherapy, having
been a member of the Society for Creative Psychology and undertaken twice-a-week
therapy. De Mare ´ believed that abreaction relieved:
...the man of pent-up emotions, and there is usually considerable release of affect. An attempt is
then made to reinforce the ego by strong suggestion, and to ‘‘come to terms with reality’’...[The
soldier] is told that he has come through the incident safely, that he must try and extricate himself
from the past, that as he succeeds in doing this, so the tension causing the impediment [movement
and speech disorders] will go.
60
He estimated that 86 per cent of admissions were sent to convalescent depots where they
were downgraded to non-combatant roles. Having been demobilized from the army, de
Mare ´ trained as a group analyst and became a consultant psychotherapist at Halliwick and
St George’s Hospitals.
AlthoughpapersinreputablemedicaljournalsproclaimedtheefficacyofPIE,theprivate
reports of military psychiatrists were modest in their claims. In reality, most soldiers worn
downbytheintensestressofcombatwereunabletogobacktofightingunitsaftertreatment.
For example, between July and September 1944 Major Burch returned only 6 per cent of
admissions to their units, the majority being sent to rehabilitation centres or to base duties.
Hissuccessor,MajorTEDancyrecordedinDecember1944thatmostsoldierstreatedthere
‘‘willneveragainbeabletofacefront-lineservice’’,addingthatgrouptherapyhadfailedto
rid most men of their somatic symptoms.
61 A secret report by Brigadier H A Sandiford,
DirectorofArmyPsychiatry,onavisitin1944toNo.39GeneralHospitalinNormandyalso
showed modest results:
Captain Henson, RAMC, neurologist, who is producing a report on 400 cases of exhaustion
received by him. Preliminary analysis of 107 cases received early on in operations shows that
43 per cent had previously been treated elsewhere for exhaustion, returned to duty and relapsed.
19 per cent were under 20 years of age ... About 50% had passed through the hands of Corps’
psychiatrists forward but this proportion had risen in patients received in October.
62
Brigadier Sandiford had also visited No. 7 Base Psychiatric Centre at Assisi
where, according to Lt Colonel Stephen MacKeith, group analytical techniques devised
59 TNA, WO222/1735, Medical Quarterly Report,
No. 1 Canadian Exhaustion Unit, July 1944 to
March 1945.
60 Captain P B de Mare ´, ‘Exhaustion Centre’
(typescript, August 1944), p. 2.
61 TNA, WO222/1735, Medical Quarterly Report,
31 December 1944, pp. 1, 4.
62 TNA, WO32/11550, ‘Psychiatric service in
operational theatres, report on visit to 21
Army Group’, p. 1.
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Edgar Jonesat Northfield were re-applied and provided ‘‘a few pointers for civilian practice’’.
63 Yet
Sandiford’s‘‘restricted’’reportdepictedmodestsuccesswithonly19percentofadmissions
discharged in the same medical category, 63 per cent being downgraded and the remainder
being evacuated to the UK or other hospitals.
64
The York Clinic, Guy’s Hospital
The York Clinic at Guy’s Hospital, set up in April 1944 by Air Commodore Robert
Gillespie was the first inpatient psychiatric unit attached to a teaching hospital in the UK.
65
Gillespie had trained at the Cassel Hospital and Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, before being
appointedphysicianinpsychologicalmedicineatGuy’sin1926.Recruitedintotheairforce
ontheoutbreakofwar,hewaspostedtotheRAFOfficers’Hospital,Torquay,toinvestigate
the nature of breakdown among aircrew. The experience of treating men with no history of
mental illness and who did not fall into the traditional asylum diagnoses led Gillespie to
consider social and cultural factors in the causation and treatment of psychoneuroses.
66
Designed to treat ‘‘psychological illnesses of all kinds from the mildest condition com-
monly called ‘nerves’ to the more severe illnesses involving mental alienation’’, the York
Clinic accepted only voluntary patients.
67 The first of the four wards was designed to treat
psychoneurosis with access to recreational space on the ground floor where the library,
occupation room and lounge were situated. With forty-three beds, much attention was
spent on providing a therapeutic atmosphere: private rooms, a gymnasium and quality
furnishings.
Mostofthe168patientsadmittedtotheYorkClinicduringitsfirstninemonthswerefrom
the armed forces, the majority being diagnosed as anxiety states and ‘‘combat exhaustion
comingagoodsecond’’.Treatmentwasbroadly-basedincludingcontinuousbaths,narcosis
and ECT for the most disturbed patients and occupational (leather work, carpentry and
modelmaking) andindividual therapyformildercases.Twopsychotherapists,includingA
McLeod, were employed and practised the method described by Adolf Meyer as ‘‘dis-
tributiveanalysis’’.Socialactivitywasidentifiedas‘‘oneofthemostimportanttherapeutic
agents’’: ‘‘the patients ...elect committees to organize weekly dances, charades, musical
evenings, debates, and games tournaments’’.
68 Although not specifically a therapeutic
community, the liberal regime and range of treatments offered marked a change from
the asylum culture and represented a conscious attempt to raise the status of psychiatry
and its allied disciplines.
Following the suicide of Gillespie in October 1945, Thomas A Munro, recently returned
from military service in India, became the York Clinic’s second director. It became part of
63S A MacKeith, ‘Lasting lessons of overseas
military psychiatry’, J. Ment. Sci., 1946, 92: 546–7.
64 TNA, WO32/11550, No. 7 Base Psychiatric
Centre, 30 September 1944.
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1945, i: 614.
66 R D Gillespie, Psychological effects of war on
citizen and soldier, New York, W W Norton, 1942,
pp. 76–7.
67R D Gillespie,The York Clinic for Psychological
Medicine, Guy’s Hospital, London SE1, London,
1944, p. 3.
68 ‘York Clinical Annual Report for 1944’
(typescript, n.d.), p. 5; see also, Felix W Brown,
‘Report of the York Clinic’, Guy’s Hospital Gazette,
1945, 59: 129–33.
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War and the Practice of PsychotherapyFigure 1: The York Clinic, the six-storey building to the right, situated within Guy’s Hospital.
Photographed in September 1955, it had become part of the NHS although it still had a number of
private beds. Opened inApril 1944, the treatmentand management practisedat the York Clinic owed
muchtotherapeuticcommunitiessetuptotreatservicemensufferingfromtheaccumulatedstressand
trauma of combat. It was said to have been the first dedicated psychiatric unit within a UK teaching
hospital. (Photo: Guy’s Hospital.)
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Edgar Jonesthe NHS in 1948 when fifteen of the forty-one beds were allocated to the health service.
Oncethewarhadended,servicepatientswerereplacedbyciviliansandstaffwerepresented
withadifferentsetofpriorities;theywererequiredtoassess‘‘thepersonalityofthepatient,
hisemotionalandinstinctivelife,thedomestic,economicandsocialbackgroundofhislife,
thespecificwayinwhich hehastriedtoestablishanequilibriuminhisownpersonalityand
tolerable working arrangements within his surroundings’’.
69 In 1956, when 340 patients
were discharged, 181 (53 per cent) were private and 159 (47 per cent) were NHS, though
almost two-thirds were ‘‘drawn from the managerial and professional classes with only a
sprinklingofmanualandunskilled workers’’.
70Theatmosphereoftheclinicwasdescribed
by J J Fleminger, who arrived in 1955 to find:
...a compact unit on a ‘‘domestic scale’’ where a relatively small staff knew each other well ...
The sister in charge of the York Clinic entertained us to tea with sandwiches and cakes every
afternoon at half-past three. The York Clinic had its own kitchen and chef ...It was all not merely
comfortable—it was charming.
71
Post-War Organization of Psychotherapy
In 1942, at the behest of the Ministry of Health, C P Blacker surveyed psychiatric out-
patient facilities in England and Wales, comparing wartime usage with that for 1938.
72
Designed to identify the needs of the civilian population in peacetime, Blacker made no
specific recommendations for psychotherapy, though he addressed the roles of psychiatric
social workers, psychologists and occupational therapists. Sympathetic to psychodynamic
approaches and having undertaken a brief training at the Tavistock Clinic, Blacker
recognized that the psychotherapy profession faced a credibility gap with the public and
medicine. Popular perceptions of ‘‘analytic procedures’’, he suggested in 1946, were
regarded as taking:
... too long to produce results which, at best, are dubious ... valuable time is wasted by
psychotherapists on chronic neurotics and psychopaths who are unhelpable, while the needs of the
average normal member of society pass unrecognized. Analytic methods of psychotherapy are
sometimes spoken of as if they were a decadent and modern fad.
73
‘‘So prevalent’’ did Blacker consider these beliefs, however ill-founded, that they would
‘‘obstruct the co-ordination of the country’s psychiatric services in any scheme designed to
provideminimumstandards’’.Indeed,in1941theclinicsetupinLondonbyEdwardGlover
and other psychoanalysts to treat those traumatized by air-raids had been forced to close
because they had no patients.
74
Most psychiatrists and psychologists recruited into the RAMC left the forces once peace
was declared. Bion undertook a training analysis with Melanie Klein and, like Rickman,
went into private practice. Foulkes was appointed consultant psychotherapist at the
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War and the Practice of PsychotherapyMaudsley Hospital. Bridger trained as a psychoanalyst with Paula Heimann and became a
key member of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relation’s consultancy team working in
industry and other large organizations.
75 Trained by Michael Balint, Main qualified as a
psychoanalyst, as did Lt Colonel J D Sutherland, the senior psychiatrist attached to the
research and training centre of the War Office Selection Boards, and became medical
director of the Tavistock Clinic.
Futhermore, the Second World War encouraged the expansion of academic departments
of psychiatry and within them the appointment of psychotherapy specialists. However, this
was not without precedent. William Brown had been consultant psychotherapist at King’s
College Hospital from 1925 to 1931,
76 and W Lindesay Neustatter had served as the
Maudsley’s therapist from 1931. Seven years later, he became physician in psychological
medicine to Queen Mary’s Hospital for the East End.
77 In 1946, Frederick Dillon became
consultant physician in psychological medicine at University College Hospital having
worked as a therapist while a clinical assistant under Bernard Hart.
78 Yet, by 1950 there
were still relatively few consultant psychiatrists in London teaching hospitals and fewer
psychotherapists.
79 The appointment of psychotherapy specialists appears to have been a
feature of the 1960s and 1970s rather than the immediate post-war period. For example,
Guy’s Hospital Medical School, which had a sound reputation for psychiatry, following
the work of R D Gillespie, D Stafford-Clark and J J Fleminger, did not elect its first
consultant psychotherapist, Derry Macdiarmid, until 1981, though he had been appointed
senior lecturer in psychotherapy at the Middlesex Hospital four years earlier.
Why, then, was psychotherapy slow to develop in the post-war period? First, there was
resistance from the medical profession. Despite wartime publications suggesting positive
clinical outcomes, the absence of a convincing scientific explanation for symptoms or
treatments gave critics ready ammunition. Yet therapists themselves did little to introduce
procedures and hypotheses to a wider audience and no concerted attempt was made to
integrate the embryonic profession with other disciplines. In the 1950s, from both a
theoretical standpoint and in terms of training, psychoanalysis, whether Freudian or
Jungian, held a virtual monopoly over individual therapy. Jargon (terms such as
super-ego, id, cathexis, Oedipus complex and so forth) introduced to gain intellectual
credibility were probably counterproductive in so far as they obfuscated meaning and
inhibited dialogue with other disciplines. Furthermore, many key analysts, such as
Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, were European e ´migre ´s. Their intra-psychic model
of neurosis did not resonate with the British empirical tradition, which placed greater
emphasis on the senses (and instruments that extend their range) and experiment to frame
ideas. Indeed, the object-relations school (as expressed by Donald Winnicott, John
Bowlby, W R D Fairbairn and Charles Rycroft) was in part a response to what was
essentially a deductive system in which fundamental principles (largely derived from
Freud) were used to frame knowledge.
75Rayner, op. cit., note 2 above,
p. 263.
76 ‘Obituary’, Lancet, 1952, i:
1073.
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Edgar JonesA desire to follow a pure stream of Freudian thought deterred the British Psycho-
Analytic Society from seeking collaborative ventures with medical schools or psychology
departments. For the small number of demobilized psychiatrists whose interest had been
captured by psychodynamic ideas during wartime, there were few training opportunities
apart from the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Although in 1936 Jungian therapists had
begun discussions on setting up their own training body, a constitution for the Society of
Analytical Psychologists was not framed until 1946 with the return of servicemen such as
Brigadier E A Bennet. Not until 1951 was the British Association of Psychotherapists
(BAP) set up with Freudian and Jungian wings, with a reduced training requirement of
three-times a week therapy.
By its very nature, psychoanalysis could never flourish as a mass movement. The
barriers to entry were high: a prior qualification in medicine or psychology was usually
required, while an extended period of five-times a week therapy imposed financial and
occupational limits. As a result, membership of the British Psycho-Analytic Society rose
steadily rather than spectacularly from 92 in 1939 to 129 in 1950 and reached 175 by
1954,
80 though these figures included some analysts resident in the United States and the
Commonwealth, and others who had retired. Given the demanding training, it was difficult
for the Society to have grown at anything other than a sedate pace, while the focus of its
membership in London inhibited its expansion to other regions of the UK. Furthermore,
psychoanalysis was a self-contained system of ideas and beliefs, more a way of life than a
profession. Unable to meet the diverse and immediate needs of the National Health
Service (NHS), it promoted itself as a higher authority, training and supervising mental
health professionals, while attempting to provide intellectual guidance through the
Hogarth Press monographs and the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. The rise
of evidence-based medicine, alternative models of mental illness and pressure to provide
cost-effective clinical services during the 1980s undermined its claim for pre-eminence.
It has been argued that by creating a demand for psychotherapy, which psychiatrists and
general practitioners could not supply once peace had returned, the Second World War
gave clinical psychologists the opportunity to break the medical monopoly.
81 The need for
brief focused therapies, delivered in outpatient clinics to treat less severe disorders,
allowed this university-based profession to occupy new territory. In addition, a serious
challenge to analytical theory came from clinical psychologists, such as Hans Eysenck at
the Maudsley, who offered behavioural explanations for psychological disorders. Based
on laboratory studies of conditioning and on modern learning theory, neurotic symptoms
were conceived as the disorder rather than symptoms of unconscious conflict about
introjected parental figures or instinctual drives. In contrast to psychoanalysis, Eysenck’s
system had the appeal that it could be learned, practised and measured relatively easily.
Treatment strategies included desensitization (or counter-conditioning), flooding
(extended exposure to the conditioned stimulus) and modelling (the presentation of coping
strategies). In an increasingly cost-conscious NHS required to demonstrate the effective-
ness of clinical interventions, this form of brief focused therapy leant itself to statistical
80Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 1939, 20: 504–6; Int. J.
Psycho-Anal., 1950, 31: 311–13; Int. J. Psycho-Anal.,
1954, 35: 471–3.
81Mathew Thomson, ‘The psychological body’,
in Cooter and Pickstone (eds), op. cit., note 14
above, pp. 291–306, p. 300.
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War and the Practice of Psychotherapyevaluation. Indeed, as a result of random-controlled trials, its successor cognitive-
behaviour therapy (CBT) has become the standard intervention for post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD).
Growth of dynamic psychotherapy in the embryonic health service was gradual.
Although services were introduced as a result of doctor initiatives, psychiatric social
workers also played a significant role during the 1960s and 1970s. Concerned to reha-
bilitate patients often institutionalized by lengthy admissions and to find ways of pre-
venting relapse, they sought psychodynamic ideas that could be adapted to fit models of
brief focused psychotherapy. Client-centred and task-oriented therapies were devised to
tackle practical problems in relatively short periods of time. The Family Welfare Associa-
tion, an organization that employed social workers trained in psychotherapy, played an
important part in broadening the application of these initiatives.
82
As regards training, London dominated in the post-war period. Not only were the
Freudians, Jungians and BAP located in the capital but so too the Lincoln Clinic and
Centre for Psychotherapy (founded in 1967 by Lionel Monteith), the Institute of Group
Analysis (set up in 1971 by S H Foulkes) and the London Centre for Psychotherapy
(1974). Not until twenty-five years after the war did Scotland get its own organizations:
the Scottish Institute for Human Relations founded in 1970 by Sutherland after
his retirement from the Tavistock, and the Scottish Association of Psychoanalytical
Psychotherapists (1972).
Post-War Therapeutic Communities
By raising questions about the nature of certain psychological disorders, the war
influenced the design of specialist treatment centres in the NHS. Main, for example, put
ideas framed during wartime into practice when he was appointed director of the Cassel
Hospital. A therapeutic community was also established by Maxwell Jones as director
of the Industrial Neurosis Unit at Belmont Hospital, Sutton (later re-named the Hen-
derson Hospital), which initially accommodated 100 patients in four wards, though
occupancy halved over the next twenty years as its activities broadened. In 1947,
because his training had been in mainstream psychiatry and wishing to improve his
‘‘skills in group psychotherapy and psychodynamics generally’’, Jones entered a
training analysis with Melanie Klein, though three years later ended this before
qualification.
83
The idea that the community itself might serve as instrument of therapy, developed at
Northfield and Mill Hill where it was designed to treat neuroses, was also taken up in
modified form by asylums for those who suffered from chronic disorders or psychosis.
More liberal regimes, for example, were adopted at Fulborn from 1953 as a result of
initiatives by David Clark (who had worked with David Henderson at the Royal Edinburgh
Hospital and Foulkes at the Maudsley) and at Claybury following the appointment of
Dennis Martin in 1955.
84
82Malan, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 229.
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Edgar JonesTherapeutic communities were set up at Halliwick Hospital and at Atkinson Morley’s,
the neuro-psychiatric inpatient unit of St George’s Hospital. Professor A H Crisp was
the driving force behind the latter where group analysts, Patrick de Mare ´ and Malcolm
Pines were recruited as consultant psychotherapists. When J P Watson was appointed to
the chair of psychiatry at Guy’s in 1974, he brought with him some of the ideas worked out
at Atkinson Morley’s Hospital. Under Watson and B K Rosen, George Savage ward in
the York Clinic evolved as a form of therapeutic community and functioned as such until
the building was vacated in 1997.
Conclusions
The Second World War did advance the development of psychotherapy in the UK both
as a recognized form of treatment and as a profession, though its impact was often delayed
or slow to take effect. The conflict provided seemingly robust statistical evidence that
individual and group therapies could address the immediate psychological effects of battle
and their longer-term consequences. Publications in leading medical journals buttressed its
claim for scientific respectability. The apparent absence of war neuroses in returning
veterans, in contrast to the shell shock epidemic of the First World War, reinforced this
impression of effectiveness. The widespread deployment of psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists in the armed forces raised the general profile of psychological medicine among
doctors and servicemen. Although much suspicion remained, the market for psychother-
apy had been extended, providing new opportunities for mental health professionals. The
decision of a number of ex-military psychiatrists, such as Bion, Main and Sutherland, to
train at the Institute of Psycho-Analysis both broadened its intellectual basis and added a
measure of credibility.
Having established their pedigree in the army, groups became an accepted form of
treatment in the NHS. Equally, the concept of the therapeutic community found a place in
a state-funded health service and was seen at its fullest expression in the Cassel, Halliwick
and Henderson Hospitals. In dilute form, these ideas spread to psychiatric wards opened in
generalhospitals wheregroups, occupational therapy and systems of key workers reflected
a more liberal attitude towards patients and psychological disorders.
85 Because of cost-
limitations, provision for individual therapy within the NHS remained limited in the post-
war period. Confined to a small number of specialist units, such as the Tavistock Clinic, or
to brief, focused therapies, virtually all in-depth, long-term treatment remained in the
private sector.
The boost given to the academic credibility of psychiatry by the war allowed
teaching hospitals to expand departments of psychological medicine and these
commonly included a consultant psychotherapist, though most remained part-time.
The creation of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in 1971 and its membership examina-
tions, which subsumed the Diploma in Psychological Medicine, saw psychodynamic
85 Ibid.; Kathleen Jones, Mental health and social
policy 1845–1959, London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1960, p. 168.
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War and the Practice of Psychotherapyideas and practices formally incorporated in the training of junior doctors. Nevertheless,
the formal introduction of psychotherapy training was delayed when it was discovered
that there were insufficient consultants outside London to provide nationwide coverage.
In the event, as Pines has argued, the accompanying training scheme broke the
monopoly of the private psychoanalytic institutes in providing a recognized qualification
to practice.
86
86 Pines, op. cit., note 11 above, p. 229.
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